Has the United States at last committed to taking on the Iranian regime to force it to abandon its illegal practices? Over the course of the Cold War, the United States helped bring down the Soviet empire with a comprehensive strategy that included both pressure and effective diplomacy. Washington has only recently indicated it is prepared both to use force against Iran and to engage diplomatically with its leaders.
President Trump appears to be demonstrating the well-recognized but seldom-applied principle that an effective foreign policy requires both strength and diplomacy.
Changing the conduct of an entrenched, radical regime is no easy task.
Radical regimes like Iran’s must be forced—not just convinced—to abandon aims and methods inconsistent with fundamental global norms.
The United States helped defeat the Soviet Union through such a determined, consistent, and comprehensive effort. The Reagan Doctrine made clear the US intent to respond by supporting governments and groups being attacked pursuant to the Brezhnev Doctrine, which openly sought to overthrow non-socialistic regimes. We helped countries and groups counter such Soviet intervention by supplying them with arms and other assistance. We also developed and stationed weapons and troops in Europe and other places to deter Soviet aggression.

Simultaneously, the United States persisted in diplomatically engaging the Soviet Union, despite its misconduct. When the Soviets deliberately destroyed Korean Air Lines Flight 007, killing 269 people, President Reagan took punitive actions against the Soviet regime but continued negotiations. As then–secretary of state George Shultz explained in a 1985 article: “President Reagan made sure the world knew the full unvarnished truth about the atrocity; nevertheless, he also sent our arms control negotiators back to Geneva, because he believed that a reduction in nuclear weapons was a critical priority.”
Before President Trump took office, the United States had failed to use both strength and diplomacy in dealing with Iran. At times, the United States used strength, as when President Reagan launched Operation Praying Mantis in 1988 to stop Iran’s mining of waters in the Persian Gulf. In that operation, the US Navy attacked Iranian oil platforms and sank or destroyed several vessels. At other times, though, we did not use strength against Iran’s illegal activities. Nor did we ever simultaneously pursue engagement with Iran as we did with the Soviets.
Instead of negotiating directly with Iran, senior officials in the Reagan administration sold arms to Tehran during the 1985–86 Iran-Contra affair, an attempt to free American hostages held in Lebanon while using the profits to fund the Contras in Nicaragua. Some years later, President Obama’s transfer of a planeload of cash, another supposed inducement to Iran, would lead to nothing useful. President Clinton’s decision not to respond to Iran’s support of the 1996 bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, failed to lead to better relations. And while President George H. W. Bush said that “goodwill begets goodwill,” he refused to engage with Iran despite then–Iranian president Ali Akbar Rafsanjani securing the release of all Western hostages in Lebanon, with President Bush citing Iran’s illegal activities around the world.
It appears now, however, that the Trump administration has decided to rely on both strength and diplomacy in dealing with Iran. It has attacked Iranian nuclear sites and now has moved ships and planes within striking distance.
It remains to be seen whether the president will continue to convey, tangibly and credibly, that Iran must end its efforts to advance its nuclear weapons program, arm its surrogates, and engage in other illegal conduct.
To demonstrate resolve, the US actions should, for example:
Eliminate Iranian defensive capacities until Iran stops engaging in or supporting attacks on US or allied ships, personnel, or interests.
Attack Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps assets to end any semblance of IRGC impunity, as was signaled in the killing of its leader, General Qasem Soleimani, in 2020.
Destroy unlawful nuclear-related facilities and nuclear-weapons-related infrastructure through targeted attacks.
Respond to Iranian support for its surrogates by sinking ships bearing Iranian arms supplies to the Houthis in Yemen or to other groups attacking US or allied shipping.
Reimpose multilateral economic sanctions aimed at ending Iran’s nuclear weapons program and other illegal activities.
Congress and the American people should support President Trump’s decision to use both strength and diplomacy to end Iran’s intransigence. Only strength, applied with limits to avoid civilian casualties, can force Iran to cease its aggressions.
Strength alone, however, will not be enough to take on Iran successfully. President Trump should continue to engage Iran constructively. Negotiations should be used to make clear the need for Iran not only to give up its nuclear weapons ambitions but also to end its long-range missile program and its attacks on other countries, directly or through surrogates.
During previous presidential administrations, the United States failed to give Iran reason to believe it was ready to use all measures necessary to force an end to its threats and other improper conduct. A comparison to North Korea is useful here. In dealing with Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, US officials tried negotiations, sanctions, gifts of food, economic support, and unambiguous threats. But bluffing, instead of acting, failed. Now, that hostile country has many nuclear weapons and is supplying arms to the world’s most oppressive regimes.
President Trump signaled his seriousness in his attack on Soleimani; in his cooperation with US allies in response to Iranian aggression and Houthi attacks; and in his recent attacks on nuclear-related sites within Iran. Iran’s willingness to negotiate despite these attacks reflects the utility of pressure in attempts to persuade Iran to change course.
The president should end the long record of US failures to grasp opportunities to alter Iran’s conduct through both strength and diplomacy.
Abraham D. Sofaer is the George P. Shultz Senior Fellow (emeritus) at the Hoover Institution and the author of Taking On Iran: Strength, Diplomacy, and the Iranian Threat (Hoover Institution Press, 2013).

