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In this episode of China Considered Quick Takes, Liz Economy breaks down what’s new—and what remains unchanged—in the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy as it relates to China and the Indo-Pacific. She highlights that despite speculation that the United States is pulling back globally, the NSS makes clear that Washington is still firmly committed to the Indo-Pacific. Longstanding priorities such as countering fentanyl, addressing predatory trade practices, ensuring access to critical minerals, and deterring an attack on Taiwan remain central elements of the strategy.
At the same time, Economy notes a striking tension: the NSS calls out problems closely associated with China without explicitly naming China as the source. This ambiguity may reflect a desire to preserve positive momentum in US–China trade negotiations, but it also raises questions about strategic clarity. Even so, the Indo-Pacific emerges as an area of continuity within the broader NSS—something that US allies and partners in the region will likely find reassuring.
Transcript
Welcome to another edition of China Considered Quick Takes. I’m Liz Economy, Hargrove Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution.
Today, I want to take a few minutes to talk about what’s new and what’s not in the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy, or NSS, as it relates to the United States and China.
First, China and the Indo-Pacific are still very much a priority region for the United States. There’s been a lot of chatter over the past year that the United States is retreating from the global stage and just wants to focus on the Western Hemisphere.
The national security strategy makes clear that’s not the case. The United States is still very much a Pacific power, and for both economic and national security reasons, the Trump administration is all in in the Indo-Pacific.
In addition, many of the priority issues that the NSS addresses haven’t changed. The administration still wants to stop the spread of fentanyl, stop predatory trade practices, ensure that the United States has access to critical minerals, and deter an attack on Taiwan.
But the strategy never makes clear that China’s behind all of these problems.
The strategy does raise the need for the United States to rebalance its trade relationship with China to make it more fair and more reciprocal.
But there’s an odd tension in the document between calling out Chinese actions, but never actually calling out China. This may be because the administration wants to maintain positive momentum in the US-China trade negotiations. But if I can read between the lines, I’m sure that the Chinese can too.
The NSS also affirms the importance of partners and allies like Japan and India and Australia working together with the United States to ensure peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, to secure open trade lanes, and to compete with China in the Global South.
There’s no mention of democracy or shared values. The NSS is less an inspired call to action than a directive to US allies and partners to do what the United States wants.
Nonetheless, when compared with other parts of the strategy, for example, Washington’s relations with Europe, there’s much more continuity than change. And for that, I would imagine that our Indo-Pacific partners and allies are breathing a deep sigh of relief.
Elizabeth Economy is the Hargrove Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Named by Politico as among “the ten names that matter in China policy,” Economy served as senior adviser for China in the US Department of Commerce in 2021–23 and is the author of several influential books on Chinese politics and policy, most recently The World According to China.