California, home to the world’s greatest technology cluster, features very expensive housing and has enacted some of the most ambitious decarbonization regulatory efforts in the United States. These facts are interconnected. The statewide median price of an existing single-family home has recently hovered near $900,000. In the coastal metros that generate most of the state’s economic opportunity, a middle-class household can work full time and still be locked out of homeownership. Young families delay forming households. Workers live farther from jobs than they would choose. Others leave for Phoenix, Las Vegas, Austin, or Dallas.
Land use zoning has played an important role in limiting the supply of housing in highly desirable and productive areas such as Silicon Valley. But even when a county rezones land, even when elected supervisors vote to approve a project, and even when a developer is prepared to build tens of thousands of homes, construction can still fail to take place. In California, the right to build is not the same thing as the ability to build.
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) is a major limit to growth. Under CEQA, a defect in one chapter of an environmental impact report can freeze an entire project. Opponents do not need to persuade a legislature that a project should never be built; they need only to convince a court that the paperwork was inadequate.
Delay is not a side effect of that system. Delay is the system.
The sad tale of Tejon Ranch
The Centennial project, proposed on roughly 12,300 acres of the historic Tejon Ranch in northwestern Los Angeles County near Gorman, is not a handful of custom lots. The approved plan proposed about 19,300 homes for roughly 57,000 residents, including thousands of affordable units; millions of square feet of business-park and commercial space; on the order of 23,000 permanent jobs; and nearly half the site reserved as open space. It was meant to be a new town, not a subdivision.
The following sequence of events shows how California turns a town into a case file.
The partnership behind Centennial filed initial planning documents in 2002. The first version was even larger, on the order of 23,000 homes, and the company said the first residents could be in place by 2007 if approvals came through. Los Angeles County issued a Notice of Preparation in 2004 and opened formal environmental review. That is the year the CEQA clock started.
A family who wanted to buy one of those houses that year has now waited through two recessions, a pandemic, and a complete reset of California housing politics. And they’re still waiting.
The next six years were filled with studies, scoping, and politics, not construction. In 2008, Tejon Ranch struck a landmark conservation deal with the Sierra Club, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Audubon California, and other groups: roughly 90 percent of the 270,000-acre ranch would be protected, and the signatories would not oppose development on the remaining slice that included Centennial. That bargain was supposed to buy peace. It did not buy a building permit. CEQA does not run on handshake conservation agreements. It runs on documents that can be challenged by anyone who did not sign.
The environmental review then had to be restarted and enlarged. The county issued a revised Notice of Preparation in 2015. A draft environmental impact report finally circulated in 2017, thirteen years after the first one was noticed. The Regional Planning Commission recommended approval in 2018. In December 2018, the Board of Supervisors voted 4–1 to approve the project; in April 2019, the county certified the EIR and issued the entitlements. After seventeen years, Centennial had what looked, on paper, like the right to build.
Litigation arrived in weeks. In May 2019, Climate Resolve and, separately, the Center for Biological Diversity and the California Native Plant Society sued. The courts did not independently find that the social costs of Centennial exceeded its social benefits. They found that the environmental review was legally inadequate; in particular, that the county had improperly treated California’s cap-and-trade program as project-level mitigation and had not sufficiently analyzed offsite wildfire risk. A superior court later rescinded the approvals. The developers appealed. On June 26, 2025, the Court of Appeal affirmed. That fall, the court issued a writ of mandate. In December 2025, the county formally set the approvals aside.
More than twenty years after the first filing, the project was scaled back. It was bargained over with major environmental groups. It was studied again. It was recommended by planning staff. It was again approved by elected supervisors. A dispute over how to measure carbon and describe wildfire risk beyond the site pulled the entire town back to the starting line.
In 2026, the developer and the county were recirculating a partial draft EIR and hoping to return to the Planning Commission. There is still no honest construction start date.
Each year of delay raises the carrying cost of land, exposes the investment to higher construction costs and interest rates, and creates another window for opposition. In this way the CEQA functions as a probabilistic tax on housing.
A clever NIMBY strategy
NIMBY-ism is usually described as neighborhood self-interest dressed up as planning: complaints about traffic, parking, shadows, school crowding, “community character.” Those “not in my back yard” arguments still matter.
What has changed is that climate change emissions mitigation has given NIMBY-ism a more powerful vocabulary.
Carbon is unusually useful in litigation. Electricity use, natural-gas consumption, vehicle miles, and emissions factors can all be converted into one number. California publishes statewide climate targets and detailed rules for mitigation. A litigant can therefore identify a numerical claim, challenge an assumption, and show that a different assumption changes the reported result. Habitat, neighborhood character, and the social value of additional housing may be no less important than climate mitigation, but they are harder to put on a spreadsheet that a court can audit.
CEQA’s baseline makes the spreadsheet even more potent. The statute requires an environmental impact report to compare a proposed project with a “no project” alternative. Undeveloped land is often treated as generating little or no carbon. A new community then mechanically increases measured emissions at the parcel. The project looks dirty because the baseline looks empty. That is administratively convenient. It is not an economic description of the world.
People have to live somewhere. If 19,300 homes are not built at Tejon Ranch, the households who would have lived there do not vanish from the national housing market. They rent longer in Los Angeles. They bid up scarce units in other California cities. Or they move to the Sun Belt.
The legal question CEQA asks is: How many tons would this project emit on this site relative to empty land? The economic question is different: If these people are displaced, where do they go, and what do they emit there?
That second question is where place-based carbon accounting fails.
The cost of sending people elsewhere
More than a decade ago, Edward Glaeser and I asked a simple question. Hold household income and size fixed, and how much greenhouse gas would that same household produce from driving, heating, and cooling if it lived in different American cities, and if it lived downtown rather than in the suburbs of the same metro area? The footprints varied widely. Compact coastal cities with mild climates and relatively clean electric grids look very different from hot, sprawling metros powered by dirtier electricity.
That research is awkward for CEQA’s project-level carbon test. California’s grid is cleaner than the grids of Texas or the desert Southwest, where many Californians are going. Coastal California needs less air conditioning than Phoenix. A household that cannot find a home in a relatively efficient place does not stop consuming energy. It consumes energy somewhere else, often in a hotter climate, in a larger house, on a longer commute, and on a dirtier grid.
The arithmetic is not mysterious. Suppose California is the lower-carbon region and a Sun Belt metro is the higher-carbon alternative. If blocking a California project simply reshuffles people inside the same clean grid, the climate loss from delay may be small. If a meaningful share of displaced households leave the state, or if the unbuilt units are not replaced anywhere in the same metro, the total emissions effect can be large.
Approving housing in a relatively clean, high-productivity state can then lower national emissions. Rejecting it can raise them. Place-based review assumes the displacement channel does not matter. The basic logic of urban economics disagrees.
This is why the “no project” baseline is so misleading. Empty land at Tejon Ranch emits almost nothing. That is true and almost irrelevant. The real baseline is the emissions of the same people living in the next-best place they can afford. CEQA scores the project against a vacant hillside. The atmosphere scores the project against Phoenix.
There is a second problem. The official carbon number is treated as a physical fact of the site. It is not. It is a forecast of household behavior over decades. The Centennial environmental review produced an unmitigated estimate of about 158,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent per year; a figure that sounds enormous even though it is a small slice of statewide emissions (over 316 million metric tons in 2024).
In generating this number, the regulator assumes away progress in energy efficiency. This estimate does not give the project credit for an all-electric building code, for heat pumps, for a grid required to get cleaner under state law, for on-site jobs that shorten commutes, or for electric vehicles charged on increasingly clean power. Courts and agencies are asked to treat the upper-tail pessimistic case as the project’s essence. Likely energy-efficiency technology progress gets no comparable weight.
A statute designed to disclose environmental risk ends up punishing the possibility of a new, cleaner community.
The remaining limits on the California dream
For those looking for some good news on unleashing housing abundance, a few recent statutes let major cities add urban capacity without a new CEQA fight. SB 79 “establishes statewide standards for housing near major transit and limits the ability of cities to apply local regulation that would prevent eligible projects from achieving the height, density, or floor area allowed by the law,” according to the Los Angeles City Planning Department. AB 2074 lets large cities designate downtown revitalization zones, with no statutory cap on their size, and upzone inside them without CEQA review. AB 684, AB 1123, and AB 1116 exempt from CEQA review the ordinances that authorize multifamily projects of up to ten units on a wide range of parcels. AB 130 then exempts many housing projects that are already consistent with local zoning.
These steps are meaningful, but they operate inside a larger system that still constrains supply. In a state of 40 million people, the current rules of the game are not achieving abundance. California built only about 111,000 homes in 2024, up from 70,000 in 2018. While there are many causes of these limits to growth, local environmental regulations over land use continue to restrict the supply of housing.
In setting local and state land use policies, regulators rarely use basic ideas from project evaluation. An environmental review reports tons of carbon. It rarely multiplies those tons by the social cost of carbon and then compares that cost with the value of thousands of homes, shorter commutes, and a larger local labor market. It almost never asks where the excluded households will go. A large local footprint can therefore defeat a project without anyone showing that stopping the project reduces national or global emissions.
CEQA is just one of the many environmental rules that limit the ability of developers to trade with property buyers. The California Coastal Commission, for instance, has considerable say over what is built within the coastal zone. In a deregulated economy, hundreds of thousands of people could live in new condos close to the ocean in areas that face less extreme heat and inland air pollution. My work with Edward Glaeser suggests this would also reduce greenhouse gas emissions as compared to what these households would produce if they lived somewhere else.
Matthew E. Kahn is a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution and a provost professor of economics at the University of Southern California. He is a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and a research fellow at IZA (the Institute of Labor Economics). His Substack is Environmental and Urban Economics.


































