In the latest episode of GoodFellows, senior fellows John Cochrane and Niall Ferguson, moderated as always by distinguished policy fellow Bill Whalen, speak with prolific columnist, podcaster, and political commentator Jonah Goldberg about the aftermath of midterm elections in which Democratic candidates prevailed in many contests across the country.
Goldberg is editor-in-chief and co-founder of The Dispatch. He’s been in the business of discussing politics and public affairs (or what he might sometimes call “rank punditry”) for decades. But unlike most pundits, he’s given to engaging with politics through the lens of ideas, putting the present in conversation with the great thinkers of political philosophy as well as pop culture.
As anyone familiar with Goldberg’s columns or podcasts knows, a conversation with him is sure to entertain as it also enlightens. In the second part of the show, John, Niall, and Bill cover elections in Israel, political controversy in Brazil, the politics of data centers around the US, and the enduring meaning of Remembrance Day in the UK.
Quote of the Day
Jonah Goldberg explains why the United States has witnessed a string of reversals in partisan control of government across recent decades. In short, he says, parties often fail to speak to persuadable voters in the middle of the ideological distribution:
Both parties have adopted with increasing alacrity a policy of focusing on a turn-out-the-base strategy rather than going for the median voter . . . The result of that is, you get elected with this idea that it’s an existential crisis, “Flight 93 election,” that kind of thing, and that we must get power. And then you get into office and you immediately start swinging for the fences as if you’ll never get elected again, and then you make that self-fulfilling prophecy. And so rather than try to do what parties have historically done in American history, which is try to be a majority party, a party that can get a 60% majority coalition rather than a 50.1% coalition, you do a lot of fan service to your base, and that perpetuates you getting thrown out, because the median voters get kind of [upset].
The Central Issue: The Structures of American Politics
If the quote above explains the mistakes that parties make by “swinging for the fences” and forgetting about the more even-keeled median voter, here Goldberg offers an explanation of why this pattern is so engrained. In his view, it’s about who actually controls the direction of the parties:
One of the most disastrous things this country did was adopt the McGovern rules about primaries. We were the first, and in many respects we’re still basically the only . . . advanced industrialized democracy in the world whose parties have given up the ability to pick their own candidates. What we’ve done instead is we’ve outsourced it to the primaries, where it turns out that the core primary voters hate their own parties. They just hate the other party more . . . If you [went to a very partisan district and] said, “If you send me to Washington, I will work with anybody to do what’s best for my state or my district,” the party faithful who control the primaries would say, “Get the hell out of here.” If you said, “If you send me to Washington, I will tear the head off the opposition and use their skulls as a victory goblet,” you would get the nomination.
John Cochrane argues that another factor fueling a sense among partisans of existential need to win elections is the massive power that the federal government, especially the presidency, has now accumulated:
I think the huge power of the presidency is part of the reason we got to this winner-take-all mentality. If government were more limited, you could afford to lose elections a little more frequently, and you could afford to be more centrist. Okay, so Democrats are in power. What are they going to do? One thing to do is pass some really thoughtful bills. Yes, Trump will veto them, and you show, “Here’s how we’re going to govern if you give us power in 2028.” Or they can go into the usual craziness, investigations, persecutions . . . Some investigations are useful, but are they really going to be the center of what [new Democratic legislative majorities] do?
Key Takeaways
What role did inflation play in the midterm election results?
John Cochrane channels his inner “Grumpy Economist” to argues that the problem with inflation is not just the marginal rate, or how much it’s currently increasing. What many voters appear angry about is the level to which prices have risen, following years of continued inflation:
“Professional economists have kind of turned a deaf ear, because we say, ‘Oh, the rate of increase of prices, inflation, has gone down. You should be happy.’ And people look at the stores, and the cumulative increase in prices is very high. Now, average real wages have kept up, people say, but not everybody’s. So lots of people, if you’ve got a new job, you got a higher wage, but not everybody’s wages have kept up. And I really think our macro establishment needs to start listening: people are [upset] by levels of prices going up. That’s a revolutionary concept if you talk to the Fed.”
Was it fair for voters to blame the state of the American economy in 2026 on President Trump?
Jonah Goldberg answers in the affirmative. In his view, the President took ownership of the direction of US economic policy with the launch of his sweeping, worldwide tariffs on what he termed “Liberation Day” in 2025. Goldberg explains:
“When Reagan came into office, he said, ‘I’m inheriting a decade of inflation, stagflation, all of these economic problems. Give me some time and I’ll fix it.’ . . . Trump came in, and everyone thought the economic problems, such as they were, were Biden’s problem. And he does Liberation Day, and he basically declares to all the world, ‘I own the economic issue now. I am responsible for the economy. It’s no longer a Biden thing. It is a Trump thing.’ And it goes south.”
John Cochrane adds that, absent the tariffs, the economy in the second Trump term could have taken a very different course:
“Trump did some amazingly good things for the economy through his first-day executive orders. [Given those policies] we are not going to commit climate suicide. We’re not going to regulate AI out of business like the Europeans did. First day. I mean, if he’d gone on day two and gone golfing for the rest of the term, [those policies gave a lot of reasons to think] the economy’s taking off.”
Recommended Reading
The GoodFellows recommend checking out Jonah Goldberg’s work at The Dispatch.
Niall Ferguson also recommends a recent column from AEI scholar and former Hoover Research Fellow Samuel J. Abrams, “The Blue Wave and America’s Era of Unstable Majorities.”
Parting Wisdom
What, then, is the ultimate political lesson to draw from the last two years, given the midterm results? Niall Ferguson has a suggestion:
I think when I look back on Trump’s second term, it was H.L. Mencken who got it right when he said, “Democracy is the theory that the [common] people know what they want and deserve to get it good and [hard].” Trump gave them Tariff Man. He gave them pretty much what he campaigned on, good and [hard], including much tougher immigration measures. And the voters said, just as Mencken implied, “Not that [hard].” I mean, “We wanted that, but not like that.” That’s kind of where we are.
That wraps up this GoodFellows conversation guide. If you like this companion to the show, or have any recommendations for future conversation guides, please let us know in the comments below.
John H. Cochrane is the Rose-Marie and Jack Anderson Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. An economist specializing in financial economics and macroeconomics, he is the author of The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. He also authors a popular Substack called The Grumpy Economist.
Niall Ferguson is the Milbank Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He is the author of sixteen books, including The Ascent of Money, Civilization, and Doom; columnist with the Free Press; founder of Greenmantle; and co-founder of the University of Austin.
